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A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History
Textualism preaches two unalterable truths regarding statutory interpretation. First, the
judge’s proper focus is the statute’s text. Second, the judge shall not consult legislative history
in interpreting that text. Textualist method rests largely on these two pillars.
This Essay argues that textualists ignore an equally fundamental aspect of the interpretive
enterprise: The inseparability of text and context. That is, a text’s meaning becomes determinate
only when paired with a specific context. 2 For example, consider a sign that admonishes, “Keep
off the grass.”3 Hanging on the wall of a drug rehabilitation clinic, the sign implores abstention
from drugs. Planted in a well-manicured lawn, the sign enjoins passersby from stepping on the
turf. Pairing the same text with different contexts changes the meaning.4
Yet, the constitutional argument for textualism drives a wedge between text and context.
Consider the view of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, whose extensive judicial and other
writings defend the practice. He argues from the Constitution’s law-making process, noting that
only a statute’s text passes through the constitutionally-prescribed law-making steps of
bicameralism (passage by both chambers of Congress) and presentment (delivery of the bill for

2

Of course, the possible meanings of words are not boundless, and context will help us select among
possible meanings given the words’ usages and the rules of syntax. One commentator makes the point with the
following example: “No amount of context will cause me to conclude that ‘Bill hit John’ really means, ‘the air
conditioner on the train was broken, and all the passengers were sweating when they got off.’ Rather, the context
makes certain interpretations more salient than others.” Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 235, at 257.
3
I borrow this example from Gerald Graff, “Keep of the Grass,” “Drop Dead,” and Other Indeterminacies:
A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 405, 407-08 (1982).
4
The text-context link is so fundamental that, even when words appear in isolation, we must hypothesize a
context to make sense of those words. Consider a professor who receives an anonymous note that simply says,
“Drop dead.” (This example is also taken from Graff, supra note 3, at 409.) To fix meaning on these words, the
professor must pair them with a hypothetical context. For example, perhaps a colleague with a sense of humor
wrote the note after a light-hearted disagreement. Or, perhaps the note is from a disgruntled former student who
received a failing grade. Paired with the former context, the note is a joke; paired with the latter context, the note is
more ominous. Selecting a hypothetical context selects meaning. Further, changing context can alter meaning just
as radically as changing text, as every text-context pairing potentially has a different meaning.
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the President’s signature or veto).5 Conversely, legislative history materials, such as committee
reports and floor debates, do not pass through bicameralism and presentment. Consequently,
only the statute’s text, and not its legislative history, is constitutionally enacted “Law” entitled to
interpretive weight.
This bicameralism and presentment argument is both incoherent and incomplete. It is
incoherent because statutory interpretation cannot proceed on text alone—text must be paired
with a context. The argument is incomplete because it is silent on the proper context with which
to pair statutory text. And this silence is ironic. While textualists like Justice Scalia invoke the
Constitution to prohibit consideration of legislative history, faithful adherence to constitutional
text and structure actually requires such consideration. This disconnect derives from
textualism’s misdirected, laser-like focuses on the result of the bicameralism and presentment
process—statutory text—to the exclusion of the process itself. The Constitution’s text and
structure treat bicameralism and presentment as important for its process as well as its result.
Thus, legislative deliberation (as reflected in legislative history) is not so much chafe to be
discarded after the final vote.
This Essay has two parts. Part I describes the textualist constitutional argument against
legislative history in statutory interpretation. In doing so, I focus on the judicial and other
writings of Justice Scalia. Part II then critiques the textualist constitutional argument and
explains how constitutional text and structure actually require judges to consider legislative
history when interpreting federal statutes.

5

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, c. 2. Of course, if the President vetoes a bill, a super-majority of both houses of
Congress is needed to override the veto.
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I.

The Textualist Argument Against Legislative History
Justice Scalia’s rejection of legislative history, and corresponding embrace of textualism,

is most extensively defended in his essay Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws.6 As the title
suggests, common-law reasoning is the springboard for his criticism. Simply put, he believes
that the common-law method is poorly suited to statutory interpretation, and that judicial
consideration of legislative history entails many of the same problems as common-law
reasoning. Section A explains Justice Scalia’s critique of common-law law making. Section B
then explains how his critique of common-law law making lead him to reject legislative history.
A.

The Common-Law Attitude

Justice Scalia begins his essay with a description and critique of the common-law
method.7 The common law is the milieu of most first year law school classes, where students
study mostly judicial decisions and not legislative texts.8 Those decisions discuss “some policy
reasons” and “earlier opinions” of other judges, but “not a single snippet of statutory law,”
because the common law “was almost entirely the creation and domain of English judges.”9
With no controlling statute, common-law judges were the law makers, not simply interpreters
and appliers of existing rules:
Famous old cases are famous, you see, not because they came out right, but because the
rule they announced was the intelligent one. Common-law courts performed two
functions: One was to apply the law to the facts. All adjudicators—French judges,
6

See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation]. Throughout this discussion, I also make margin
references to the work of Professor John Manning, a leading academic advocate of rejecting legislative history.
Professor Manning’s work shares many arguments and premises with that of Justice Scalia.
7
Id. at 3-9.
8
Id. at 4-6.
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arbitrators, even baseball umpires and football referees—do that. But the second
function, and the more important one, was to makethe law.

10

And to truly “make law,” courts must adhere to a concept like stare decisis that requires judges
to follow prior decisions. Otherwise, those decisions “would not be making any ‘law’; they
would just be resolving the particular dispute before them.”11
Stare decisis, however, leaves judges substantial discretion. The decision whether to
follow or distinguish precedent is largely unguided, leaving much room for judicial creativity.
Indeed, Justice Scalia offers a cynical description of common-law practice, calling the analysis
result-driven. The common-law judge first exercises “reason” and “the brilliance of one’s own
mind” to identify “the ‘best’ legal rule.” 12 Next, she follows or distinguishes precedent
depending on whether it supports her preferred rule. Justice Scalia summarizes as follows:
[T]he great judge—the Holmes, the Cardozo—is the man (or woman) who has the
intelligence to discern the best rule of law for the case at hand and then the skill to
perform the broken-field running though earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that
rule: distinguishing one prior case to the left, straight-arming another one on the right,
high-stepping away from precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he
reaches the goal—good law.13
This is the “common-law attitude”—a judge’s willingness to independently determine the best
rule and, through creative manipulation of existing precedent, impose that rule in a given case.
Justice Scalia next argues that the common-law attitude contradicts three constitutional
values. First, judge-made law is inconsistent with separation of powers in our democratic
9
10
11
12

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.

5

government. Democracy commands that only accountable decision makers make law. 14 As
only Congress and the President are accountable to the People, our constitutional commitment to
democracy and separation of powers dictates that those branches, not the unaccountable
judiciary, make law.15
The second and third constitutional values relate to the prohibition on ex post facto
laws.16 Generally speaking, the legislature must enact prospective rules that govern postpromulgation conduct. Conversely, common-law rules are made long after the parties’ conduct
has occurred, while the case is pending. This ex post nature of common law rules prompts two
objections. First, parties have no prior notice of the rule under which their conduct will later be
judged. Second, because the common-law judge knows who will benefit from different
decisions, she may indulge her biases and prejudices in reaching that decision. The parties,
however, will be none the wiser: The almost unlimited ability to manipulate precedent allows the
common-law judge to publicly justify any decision as the “best rule” for the case.17

13

Id. at 9.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review, Justice Scalia’s Formalism, 107 Yale L.J. 529, 530 (1997) (describing
Justice Scalia’s view as democratic formalism, meaning that the argument “is designed to ensure that judgments are
made by those with superior democratic pedigree.”).
15
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 9. At this point, Justice Scalia makes an awkward
admission—the founding generation believed that common law judges “found” the principles of the common law
and thus were not engaging in lawmaking as legislatures do. He nonetheless feels justified in taking the modern,
more “realistic view” that common law judges make law as the appropriate grounds for his separation of powers
critique of the common law attitude. This concession has two potential problems. First, it holds one historical
assumption constant while changing another, without explaining that choice. For example, here, Justice Scalia
changes the founders’ assumption regarding the nature of common-law lawmaking, but holds constant the founders’
conception of democracy and separation of powers. Why not do the opposite? Second, his argument assumes that a
change in the founders’ assumption regarding the nature of common-law lawmaking should not affect the proper
conception of separation of powers or democracy. If the founders had held a more realist view of judicial decision
making, perhaps their notions of separation of powers and democracy would have been different. Again, he offers
no explanation for leaving unmodified the original view of separation of powers and democracy.
16
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
17
Justice Scalia quotes an early commentator who sums the point nicely:
Judge-made law is special legislation. The judge is human, and feels the bias which the coloring of the
particular case gives. If he wishes to decide the next case differently, he has only o distinguish, and thereby
make new law. The legislature must act on general views, and prescribe at once for hole class of cases.
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 11 (quoting Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in
Kermit L. Hall et al., American Legal History 317-18 (1991)).
14
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B.

The Common-Law Attitude and Statutory Interpretation

Next, Justice Scalia turns to legislative history and legislative intent, arguing that judicial
consideration of those sources poses the same problems as common-law law making. Before
examining his arguments, however, it would we helpful to examine precisely what he means by
legislative history and legislative intent. As to legislative history, he means the conventional
sources that lawyers consult to determine what was said and happened during Congress’
consideration and enactment of a statute. As examples, he mentions, “the statements made in the
floor debates, committee reports, and even committee testimony.”18 Thus, Justice Scalia uses the
term in its conventional sense.
As to legislative intent, his meaning is harder to discern. Commentators generally
acknowledge at least three versions of legislative intent. First, one might mean subjective
legislative intent, meaning the subjective views of individual legislators regarding the precise
interpretive question before the court. For example, if the issue is whether a federal statute
requires a successful tort plaintiff to include punitive damages in income, we would examine
legislative history to determine what individual legislators believed about that specific question.
Second, one might mean objective legislative intent. Under this approach, we seek the
policies and values that the enacting Congress sought to promote through its legislation, and then
interpret the statute to best achieve those policies and values.19 On the punitive damages
question, that would mean asking what policy or value underlay the applicable provision of the
tax code, and whether including punitive damages would better achieve that policy or value.
Third, one might mean the purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. That approach asks

18

Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 29.
Of course, difficulties arise when a statute reflects either a compromise of conflicting values or a decision
to pursue a single value only so far.
19
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what evil or problem Congress sought to address, and what interpretation best solves that evil or
problem.20
While Justice Scalia never explains which of these views he includes in legislative intent,
a fair reading of his essay is that he objects to all three. He implies this in his statement that
statutory interpretation ought to focus on the legislature’s “‘objectified’ intent,” which he
describes as “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”21 For Justice Scalia, the only legitimate,
acknowledged sources of statutory interpretation are the text of the statute to be interpreted as
well as the texts of other statutes.22
Justice Scalia cannot possibly mean what he says. Text has no determinate meaning
outside of a context, and he completely ignores the question of which context the interpreter
should pair with a statute’s text. And this is a choice Justice Scalia must make, if implicitly, if he
is to give a statute meaning.23 For now, though, we will put this point aside, focusing instead on
why he believes judicial use of legislative history is as problematic as common-law law making.
1.

Separation of Powers

Justice Scalia’s separation-of-powers argument against legislative history rests on three
aspects of the Constitution’s legislative process. First, he looks to the law making process set

20

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation: Statutes and the Creation
of Public Policy 220 (3d ed. 2001); see also Henry Hart, Jr. & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994); Alexander M.
Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 15-17 (1957). The punitive damages example is taken from the case O=Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79
(1996). For a discussion of the interpretive issues raised by O’Gilvie, see Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: The
Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 325, 358-61 (2004).
21
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 17.
22
But see United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1988) (in opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia uses
Senate committee report to identify the object of the legislation); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 702-05 (1997) (identifying extra-textual sources routinely used by textualists).
23
See McGreal, supra note 21, at 337-39. Prof. Manning notes that Justice Scalia routinely applies context
derived outside of the legislative process. See Manning, supra note 22, at 702-05.
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forth in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution: bicameralism and presentment.24 According to
that provision, “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.”25 If the
President signs the bill or leaves it unsigned for ten days, the bill becomes law.26 If the President
objects to the bill, the President can veto the bill by returning it with his objections to the
chamber of Congress that originated the bill. Congress can then enact a law over the President’s
veto only if two thirds of both houses thereafter approve the bill.27 Only a bill that runs this
gauntlet becomes a “Law” entitled to enforcement by the President and application by the federal
courts.28 This is bicameralism and presentment.29
As bicameralism and presentment is the Constitution’s only lawmaking process, it
follows (for Justice Scalia) that only materials that pass through each step of that process are law.
Text, but not legislative history, satisfies this constitutional criterion. The same text must receive
24

U. S. Const. art. I, § 7; see Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 34-35.

25

U. S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

26

Id. There is an important exception to the rule that a bill will become law if left unsigned by the President
for more than ten days—the pocket veto. A pocket veto occurs when a law is passed and a Congress finally
adjourns its two-year term before the ten-day limit on a bill has expired. U.S. Const. art. I, ' 7, cl. 2. The President
also may use a “pocket veto” to object to a bill. Under the pocket veto, a bill will not become law if the President
does not sign the bill within 10 days of when Congress has adjourned a session after presenting the law to the
President but before the end of the 10-day period. U.S. Const. art. I, ' 7 (a bill becomes law if not signed within 10
days “unless Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which case it shall not be a law.”); see John
Houston Pope, Note, The Pocket Veto Reconsidered, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 163, 164 (1986). In that case, Congress has
deprived the President of the ability to “return” the bill to Congress with the President’s objections—the veto—and
the bill will not become law even if the President does not act on the bill within the ten days. The pocket veto is
recognized by congressional practice and has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. While Presidents have
used the pocket veto during interim adjournments or adjournments at the end of a session, id. at 164-65, one federal
court of appeals has held that the pocket veto only operates at the final adjournment of a Congress’ two-year term.
Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
27

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
Id. art. II, ' 3 (the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed”); id., art. III, ' 2 (“:The
judicial Power shall extend to all cases . . . arising under . . . the laws of the United States . . . .”).
28

29

See New York v. Clinton, 524 U.S. 417, 438-41 (1998) (Line Item Veto Act violates bicameralism and
presentment by allowing the President to effectively amend a law without action by both chambers of Congress);
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a majority vote in both chambers of Congress and be signed by the President, or overcome the
President’s veto. Conversely, the materials that constitute legislative history—committee
reports, floor statements, etc.—are neither voted on by the full Congress nor submitted to the
President.30
Of course, this argument is incomplete. While interpretation requires judges to pair
statutory text with some context, Justice Scalia’s bicameralism and presentment argument merely
rejects legislative history without identifying another source of context. Presumably, whatever
source he uses must satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment.31
Justice Scalia’s second separation of powers argument rests on a non-delegation
principle. He explains this point in a concurring opinion in Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest
Bank & Trust Co.,32 a case in which the Court’s opinion relied heavily on congressional
committee reports. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens defended the Court’s use of
committee reports, arguing that members of Congress are “busy people” who will logically rely
on the work of their trusted colleagues (e.g., committee members) to shape and define
legislation.33 Thus, “the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as
the intent of the entire Congress.”34
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-57 (1983) (legislative veto violates the constitutional requirement of
bicameralism and presentment).
30

If, for example, a citizen performs an act—let us say the sale of certain technology to a foreign
country—which is prohibited by a widely publicized bill proposed by the administration and passed by
both houses of Congress, but not yet signed by the President, that sale is lawful. It is of no consequence
that everyone knows both houses of Congress and the President wish to prevent the sale. Before the wish
becomes a binding law, it must be embodied in a bill that passes both houses and is signed by the President.
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 25.
31
See Manning, supra note 22, at 705 (“textualists’ approach to terms of art (as well as other elements of
statutory context) further highlights the textualist paradox: why must some, but not all, sources of law elaboration
hew to the command of Article I, Section 7?”).
32
516 U.S. 264 (1996).
33
Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Gerald C. MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 Yale L.J. 754, 765-66
(1966) (advocating a delegation view of legislative history).
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Justice Scalia’s response is worth quoting in full:
[A]ssuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to leave details to committees, the
very first provision of the Constitution forbids it. Article I, Section 1 provides that “[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” It has always been
assumed that these powers are nondelegable—or, as John Locke put it, that legislative
power consists of the power “to make laws, . . . not to make legislators.” No one would
think that the House of Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the broad
outlines of bills would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor details to be
written, adopted, and voted upon, only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation
consists of forming an “intent” rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do
not agree), Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small band of its
number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an intent of the
Congress.35
Under the requirements of bicameralism and presentment,36 material approved by less than the
whole Congress is not law; Congress cannot change this fundamental feature of the
Constitution’s design. A House or Senate committee, of course, is only a subset of Congress;
their reports are not a product of the whole Congress37 and are not presented to the President.

35

Bank One Chicago, 516 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As
discussed earlier, Justice Scalia joins with those commentators who believe that an “intent” of a multi-member body
like Congress is an incoherent notion. Id. (“There is no escaping the point: Legislative history that does not
represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent the intent of
the whole Congress is fanciful.”).
36

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.

37

Of course, the unitary legislature argument leaves open the possibility that some source of legislative
history may reflect the intent of Congress as a whole. For example, Justice Scalia acknowledges that such intent
might be found in a proposed statutory amendment that was rejected by both houses. See Antonin Scalia, Speech on
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Thus, giving interpretive weight to committee reports delegates law making power to a subset of
Congress.38
Note once again how Justice Scalia ignores the necessity of context. Implicit in his
argument is that statutory text has some meaning on its face, and that congressional committees
may not alter that meaning through legislative history. But, the statute’s so- called facial meaning
necessarily assumes a context within which that meaning makes sense. Justice Scalia once again
neglects the question of what context properly informs interpretation of a statute. Presumably,
given his non-delegation argument, the context must (like text) reflect a constitutional
understanding of Congress’ proper role.39
A third separation of powers argument derives from Congress’ term of office. Under
Article I, we elect the entire House and one-third of the Senate every two years.40 Each
Congress, then, has a two-year lawmaking mandate; after that two-year period, the legislative
power devolves upon the next Congress. A given Congress’ sole legacy is its statutes, and each
statute represents a particular Congress’ approach to a problem or issue. Consequently, each

Use of Legislative History Delivered between Fall 1985 and Spring 1986 at Various Law Schools, at 4 (a speech
given while he was a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Scalia, Speech”].
If a party later offers an interpretation of the statute consistent with that amendment, one could argue that Congress,
acting as a whole, has rejected that interpretation. Id. Yet, such arguments are not without problems; perhaps
Congress rejected the amendment as redundant. Also, this argument still fails the bicameralism and presentment
argument. The rejected amendment is only that—a piece of legislation that never achieved the status of law. If the
text passed by Congress is susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the rejected amendment, then so be it—the
text is the only source we have with the status of law.
38

As Justice Scalia has said elsewhere, such a delegation creates a “junior varsity Congress” and is
unconstitutional. See 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Prof. Manning similarly argues that the
Constitution bars congressional delegation of lawmaking power to a subset of that body, and that judicial use of
legislative history enables such a delegation. See Manning, supra note 22, at 696-99.
39
40

Here, Prof. Manning goes beyond Justice Scalia’s incomplete approach. See infra note .
U. S. Const. art. I, §§ 2 & 3.
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statute is necessarily a product of its time—of the learning, resources, and ideology (among other
things) of the Congress that created it.41
As times change, the problem addressed by a statute might also change, or even
disappear. Or, the statute’s solution might seem unworkable or ill-conceived, or produce
unexpected consequences. All of these new matters are the province of later Congresses:
The principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature enacts a purpose,
independent of the language in a statute, which the courts must then perpetuate, assuring
that it is fully achieved but never overshot by expanding or ignoring the statutory
language as changing circumstances require. To the contrary, it seems to me the
prerogative of each currently elected Congress to allow those laws which change has
rendered nugatory to die an unobserved death if it no longer thinks their purposes
worthwhile; and to allow those laws whose effects have been expanded by change to
remain alive if it favors the new effects.42
If judges may adjust a statute to meet change, they will do so by adapting the goals of the prior,
enacting Congress (long since out of power) to new circumstances. Such interpretive adaptation
is a form of constructive amendment. But, the Constitution reserves the power to amend federal
statutes to the current Congress. Thus, judges should not aid and abet a prior Congress’ bid for
political immortality—and to usurp the power of future Congresses—by adapting unenacted
legislative “intents” or “purposes.”
To illustrate Justice Scalia’s point, consider a communications law passed before the age
of television or the Internet. If television or the Internet fit within the text of the statute, then the
41

See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (19).
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statute applies. If not, judges must not use the purpose of the enacting Congress to determine
how that Congress would treat the new technologies. Otherwise, judges give the enacting
Congress legislative power beyond its democratically authorized term. The changed
circumstances are a matter for the current Congress to address through bicameralism and
presentment.
Again, the argument is incomplete. Justice Scalia gives us reason to focus on a statute’s
text, but offers no account of the proper context within which to understand that text.
Presumably, we should search for the context at the time of enactment, and not after the term of
the enacting Congress has expired. But, beyond that, he offers no guidance.
2.

Inadequate Notice

Recall that common-law law making operates in an ex post facto manner, with the legal
rule announced after the parties’ conduct has occurred. This effectively deprives people of
notice of the law’s requirements, denying them the opportunity to conform their actions to the
law. In the following passage, Justice Scalia turns this argument against legislative intent:
[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair
government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather
than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than the trick
the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they
could not easily be read. Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It is
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.43

42

K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
43

Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 17.
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Appeal to legislative intent allows judges to play a game of bait- and-switch. Congress enacts a
text with one meaning, upon which people rely in ordering their affairs. Then, courts defeat this
reliance by using legislative intent to substitute a different meaning.
As with the separation of powers arguments, the notice argument rests on an assumption
that the bare text has a different meaning from that suggested by legislative history. But, bare
text is a misnomer, as any reading of a text assumes a corresponding context. And Justice Scalia
neither identifies which context he favors, nor explains why that context better serves the dictates
of fair notice than does legislative history.
3.

Disguised Personal Preference

Justice Scalia’s third critique of common-law law making was that it allowed judges to
indulge personal preferences and biases. Legislative history poses the same problem:
The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own
objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to
the statutory field. When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature
said, but on the basis of what it meant, and you are assured that there is no necessary
connection between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to
ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely
bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean—which
is precisely how judges decide things under the common law.44
Further, like stare decisis, legislative history only weakly constrains judicial discretion:
Legislative history provides a uniquely broad playing field. In any major piece of
legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and there I something for everybody. As

15

Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and
pick out your friends. The variety and specificity of result that legislative history can
achieve is unparalleled.45
The judge using legislative history, like her common-law counterpart, sits as a super-legislature,
making retroactive legal rules under the guise of interpreting the legislature’s intent.
The legislative-history judge is not the only villain in this drama. The scene is also
populated by lobbyists, legislative staffers, and unscrupulous legislators who cram committee
reports, floor speeches, and the like with deceptive statements. “One of the routine tasks of the
Washington lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite in a prewritten ‘floor debate’—or, even better, insert into a committee report.”46 The picture painted is
of legislative actors and lobbyists who lost their bid to get preferred language into the bill’s text,
but then sought a partial victory by inserting favorable legislative history. On this view, much
legislative history is the tainted product of political gamesmanship.
As should be familiar by now, Justice Scalia again assumes a sharp distinction between
the meaning conveyed by plain text and that conveyed by legislative history. As before, he
ignores that text has determinate meaning only when paired with some context, and he never
explains what context he is using and why. Of course, without such an explanation, his
textualism is open to the same charge of manipulation as is legislative history and common-law
judging. For all we know, bias, prejudice, or personal policy preferences drive the choice of
interpretive context.
44

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 36.
46
Id. at 34. He adds that members of Congress seldom participate in creation of most legislative history
materials: “The floor is rarely crowded for a debate, he members generally being occupied with committee business
and reporting to the floor only when a quorum call is demanded or a vote is to be taken. And, as for committee
reports, it is not even certain that the members of the issuing committees have found time to read them . . . .” Id. at
32.
45
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II.

Critique of the Textualist Constitutional Argument
A persistent theme of Part I.B was how Justice Scalia’s textualist argument separates text

and context. He consistently focuses on the statutory text that emerges from the constitutional
law making process of bicameralism and presentment, but ignores the equally important choice
of the context within which to understand that text. As the next three sections explain, this
failing ultimately undermines each of his arguments against legislative history, and points the
way to a firmer, constitutional role for those materials.
A.

Separation of Powers

Each of Justice Scalia’s three separation of powers arguments assumes that statutory text
has unique constitutional significance. First, only text survives bicameralism and presentment.
Second, only text is the product of the entire legislature, and not simply the work of a subset
such as a committee. Third, only text reflects the specific choices of the enacting Congress,
whose term of office has since expired. All three of these arguments share a mistaken
assumption: Bicameralism and presentment is significant only for its result—i.e., the text that
emerges from the process.
I argue that bicameralism and presentment is also significant as a process—a series of
steps that mold and shape statutory text into the final product that enters the United States Code.
Specifically, bicameralism and presentment is a process intentionally constructed to generate
public debate about legislation. Consequently, legislative history—which memorializes such
debate—is a valued part of the process, and not merely a disposable byproduct left over after text
take its final form. Under this conception, both text (the statute’s words) and context (the
statute’s legislative history) constitute the validly enacted law. Thus, judicial use of legislative
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history derives from bicameralism and presentment, and does not violate it. Six aspects of the
Constitution evidence this design.
First, the Constitution requires members of Congress to meet in one place at the same
time.47 Further, neither house may do business without a quorum,48 and each house may compel
absent members to attend a legislative session.49 While seemingly obvious today, centralized
meeting of law makers was not always the practice. In England, at one time localities would
simply send their voting proxies to be tallied at a central location.50 The vote was not preceded
by a central meeting of representatives where ideas were exchanged and debated.51 So, simply
by providing for representatives to meet with one another, the founders chose a process where
debate and discussion would play a role.
Second, the Constitution’s designated manner of representation anticipated an exchange
of differing views in Congress. In the Senate, where each state has equal representation, small
and large states would exchange views and achieve compromise. In the House, where the people
are represented proportionally,52 local interests and views would be expressed, with a national
consensus emerging. In each case, the goal is to bring various interests to bear on the law
making process. Senators and representatives are not merely to register local preferences, but
rather to act as filters who would “refine and enlarge” those opinions through debate with their

47

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year”).
Id. § 5, cl. 1 (“a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business”).
49
Id. (Congress is “authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such
Penalties as each House may provide”).
50
See Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics of Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850, at 12-15
(1987).
51
Id.
52
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States which may
be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers”). The method of representation is not strictly
proportional, however, because each state is guaranteed at least one representative in the House regardless of
population. Id.
48
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colleagues.53 The resulting law making would then reflect careful debate and consideration of
state and local interests.
Third, as evidence of the public function of legislative debate, both houses of Congress
are to keep a public journal of their proceedings.54 Starting with the Annals of Congress in 1789,
both the House and the Senate have kept records setting forth votes taken and summaries of floor
debates. Today, the Congressional Record carries on that task. In these journals, senators and
representatives give reasons for their actions in each chamber, hoping to justify those actions to
one another and their constituents.55 Such justifications are necessary as each federal legislator
stands for re-election periodically, senators every six years and representatives every two years.56
In this way, the electorate may hold federal legislators accountable for their actions. In his
Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story put the point this way:
[T]he object of the [journal requirement] is to insure publicity to the proceedings of the
legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective
constituents. And it is founded in sound policy and deep political foresight. Intrigue and
cabal are thus deprived of some of their main resources, by plotting and devising
measures in secrecy. The public mind is enlightened by an attentive examination of the
public measures; patriotism and integrity and wisdom obtain their due reward; and votes
are ascertained, not by vague conjecture, but by positive facts. . . . So long as known and
53

The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (a purpose of republican government,
where law is made by representatives, is “to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a
regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.”).
54
U.S. Const., art. I, § 5 (“each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, except such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either
house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.”).
55
See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L.
Rev. 1253 (2000) (proposing a public justification theory of legislative interpretation, based on Congress’ need to
justify its legislative judgments to the electorate).
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open responsibility is valuable as a check or an incentive among the representatives of a
free people, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes, published in the face of
the world, will continue to enjoy public favor and be demanded by public opinion.57
Further, as a senator or representative needs her colleagues’ votes to enact legislation, debate and
persuasion are one way to garner support.58 It would be strange indeed to ignore these public
justifications, offered to persuade the People and their representatives as to a law’s propriety,
when later applying that law against the People.59 Thus, in our republican government premised
on accountable legislation, the public statements in the legislative record should receive weight
in statutory interpretation.60
Fourth, the Constitution grants both houses of Congress power over their rules of
procedure.61 As deliberative bodies, the House and Senate need rules that determine how a
subject is raised, who may speak, when they may speak and for how long, how to end discussion
of a subject, and similar rules necessary for orderly debate.62 The final vote on a bill is only one
step in a long and sometimes arduous legislative process. Indeed, sometimes steps well before
the final vote, such as drafting changes in committee,63 struggles to get a bill out of committee,64
56

U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (House term of office); id. § 3, cl. 1 (Senate term of office).
2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 840-41 (4th ed. 1873).
58
Some commentators discuss this point as the concept of veto gates. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 8171098; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 3, 7 (1994). Certain points in the legislative process provide an opportunity for legislators to
effectively stifle (veto) a bill unless they are persuaded to do otherwise. McNollgast, supra, at 16-21. Comments or
promises made to move the bill through one of these veto-gates should be given special interpretive weight as
passage through that gate was a necessary condition of enactment. Id.
59
See Bell, supra note 55, at 1333-39.
60
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J.1539, 1581-85 (1988).
61
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . .”).
62
See generally Charles W. Johnson, How Our Laws Are Made (22d ed. 2000),
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2003) (overview of the federal legislative
process); Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research and Legislative Guide
(1989).
63
See generally Richard Doernberg & Fred McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891 (1987).
64
See Eskridge et al., supra note 20, at 2-23 (discussing the struggle to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 out of the
House Judiciary Committee).
57
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or even the order of voting on alternative proposals,65 prove to be a bill’s defining moment.66
Again, it is these steps in the process that provide the context within which a statute derives its
meaning. The mechanical act of voting on the bill, though an essential step, offers little insight
into the statute’s meaning.
Fifth, the Constitution protects representatives and senators both from arrest while
attending a session of Congress and from punishment for words spoken on the floors of their
respective chambers.67 This guarantee allows federal legislators to speak their minds, unafraid of
prosecution and conviction by a hostile executive and judiciary respectively.68 To the framers,
this freedom enhanced the separation of powers, leaving legislative debate unconstrained by fear
of attack by a coordinate branch.69 It seems odd indeed for judges to disregard the fruits of such
debates when interpreting statutes, preferring instead a context of their own choosing. In doing
so, the judiciary would seem to accomplish indirectly that which it could not do directly. While

65

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2-3 (2d ed. 1963) (pairwise voting on multiple
proposals will not guarantee rational translation of individual preferences to social choice).
66
See, e.g., Eskridge et al., supra note 20, at 2-23 (describing procedural hurdles in path of enacting Civil
Rights Act of 1964, including getting the bill out of the House Rules Committee and overcoming a Senate
filibuster).
67
U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”). For
a review of the history of these guarantees, see Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom
of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (1968); Terence M. Fitzpatrick, Comment, The Speech or Debate Clause: Has the Eighth Circuit Gone
Too Far?, 68 UMKC L. Rev. 771, 775-81 (2000). For cases applying the clause, see United States v. Johnson, 383
U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, (1972);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972) (privilege applies to both members of Congress and their aides
when those aides are performing legislative functions); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
68
See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-85.
69
The Court has explained the separation of powers point as follows:
Behind these simple phrases lies a history of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and Stuart
monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and civil law to suppress and intimidate
critical legislators. Since the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and throughout United States history, the
privilege has been recognized as an important protection of the independence and integrity of the
legislature. In the American governmental structure the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing
the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders. . . . . The legislative privilege,
protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is
one manifestation of the “practical security” for ensuring the independence of the legislature.
Id. at 178-79.

21

the Constitution prohibits the judiciary from imposing legal punishment on legislative speech,
the Court indirectly punishes legislators by ignoring such speech and debate when implementing
their handiwork.
Sixth, after a bill passes the House and Senate, it is presented to the President, who has
ten days to review the bill with his cabinet.70 In doing so, the President may ask executive
officials for their written advice.71 And if the President decides to veto a bill, he shall send the
bill back to Congress with a public statement explaining the grounds for the veto.72 By allowing
the President time for reflection and an opportunity for counsel, the Constitution expects the
President’s decision to be deliberative.73 Along with the congressional debates, the President’s
signing or veto statements constitute a statute’s public context, and it is that public context that
the People will use when judging Congress and the President’s actions at the next election.
These constitutional provisions reveal bicameralism and presentment as a constitutional
process, where legislators debate and sometimes produce legislation. And this point should be
crucial to Justice Scalia. No other context one might use to interpret a statute has this
constitutional pedigree. Because legislative history is the best evidence of what occurred during

70

U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it”).
71
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the President “may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the
executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices”).
72
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that
House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to
reconsider it”).
73
For example, before signing the bill that created the first Bank of the United States, President George
Washington sought written opinions from Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. See Paul E. McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1107, 1120 (2000). And, before exercising his first veto, which disapproved a bill apportioning
the House of Representatives, President Washington sought written opinions regarding the constitutionality of the
law. See George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), reprinted in 1 A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 124 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896); 2 Annals of Congress 119 (1792)
(reporting that President Washington’s veto message is received by the House, and the House failed to override the
veto by the necessary two-thirds vote); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905,
907 (1990).
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the bicameralism and presentment process, that material provides a constitutionally-preferred
context for interpreting statutory text. 74
We can now see how Justice Scalia’s non-delegation argument is a red herring. Recall
his argument that consulting legislative history, such as committee reports, impermissibly
delegates law making power to a subset of Congress. Because the Constitution vests the
legislative power in the entire Congress, this delegation is forbidden. This argument, however,
poses a false choice between, on the one hand, meaning that resides in the text and, on the other
hand, meaning that resides in legislative history. The choice is false because text does not have
determinate meaning outside of a context. When Justice Scalia refers to plain text, what he
really means is text understood in some context other than the statute’s legislative history. Thus,
the real choice is not between text and legislative history, but rather between text understood
within its legislative history and text understood within some other context.
This entirely reframes the non-delegation argument as a question of whose context ought
to control a statute’s meaning.75 Again, bicameralism and presentment is the constitutionally-
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On the centrality of this context to statutory meaning, see Solan, supra note 20, at 256 (“We should not
insulate ourselves from the context within which legally significant words were uttered if we care about ascertaining
what the speaker intended to convey.”); see also Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 262-69 (1990)
(discussing the “plain meaning fallacy” that ignores relevant interpretive context).
75
Here, Prof. Manning’s argument offers a significant advance over that of Justice Scalia by adding a
refinement to the bicameralism and presentment argument. Like Justice Scalia, he argues that judicial use of
legislative history effectively allows delegation of congressional law making power to the subset of Congress who
created the legislative history material. Manning, supra note 22, at 718 (“If courts give authoritative weight to
committee reports or sponsors’ statements, the enactment of vague or ambiguous statutory language transfers the
majority’s discretion (within the range of possible meanings) to a legislative committee or sponsor.”). Going
beyond Justice Scalia’s account, he argues that allowing this shift of “law elaboration” from the whole Congress to a
subset of Congress impermissibly makes legislating less costly. Id. at 719 (“Using legislative history to that end
allows Congress to shift law elaboration from the full legislative process to the less cumbersome process of
generating legislative history.”). Yet, the framers intentionally made the legislative process—bicameralism and
presentment—costly so that law making would not be too easy. Id. If Congress wants to make a cost-saving
delegation of the law-elaboration function, thereby bypassing the costly bicameralism and presentment process, he
argues, it must delegate that function to an actor over which it has no control, such as the courts or an administrative
agency. Id. This leaves Congress with two choices. On the one hand, Congress can use the bicameralism and
presentment process to place its preferred meaning in the text. On the other hand, Congress can leave statutory text
ambiguous, leaving law elaboration to the discretion of others.

23

prescribed context of a statute, and legislative history memorializes that context. Any other
context lacks this constitutional legitimacy. Only by rejecting legislative history, and thereby
selecting a different context for statutory text, does a judge delegate law making power—the
power to choose statutory context—outside of constitutional channels.
B.

Inadequate Notice

By rejecting legislative history, Justice Scalia has created his own notice problem. Recall
that he criticizes resort to legislative history because it makes statutory interpretation infinitely
manipulable and indeterminate. Consequently, we cannot predict which interpretation will
ultimately prevail, and we lack advance notice of precisely what the statute requires.
Rejecting legislative history does not solve the notice problem. Without legislative
history, a judge must look elsewhere for context to give meaning to statutory text. The source of
that context will necessarily lie outside of the text. Further, because Justice Scalia offers no
guidance in selecting an interpretive context, the judge’s unguided discretion will determine

In making, this argument, Prof. Manning makes the same analytical move as Justice Scalia: He artificially
severs statutory text and context. In doing so, he never adequately answers an important objection: Why not read
legislators as adopting a statutory text as understood against the backdrop of its legislative history? Congress
adopts as law the text in context, with the courts and executive agencies free to interpret and implement that law.
This view seems persuasive given three facts about the legislative process: (1) legislators are aware that legislative
history materials are created as a matter of course, (2) legislators have regular access to such legislative history
materials, and (3) legislators are free to vote against a bill if they disagree with any material in its legislative history.
Because legislative history can be a basis for voting against a statute, just as can the text, it is hard to see how
legislative history is any less subject to the strictures of bicameralism and presentment than text. See Charles Tiefer,
The Reconceptualization Of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 205, 262-64. That a given
legislator either has no time or desire to read the legislative history should be of no moment. As with all human
beings, legislators decide what level of information gathering is rational for a given decision. See Richard Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 2000) (discussing the economics of information). They may read the bill’s
entire text and legislative history, or they may rely on the judgment of colleagues, staff or committee bill summaries,
or their constituents’ expressed desires. That is, and should be, their choice. Indeed, if a legislator sees no need to
read a bill’s final text before voting, both Justice Scalia and Prof. Manning honor that decision and nonetheless
accept the statute’s text. Yet, simply because the legislator exercised the same discretion as to the statute’s context
(including its legislative history), they reject that source of meaning. Neither Justice Scalia nor Prof. Manning
adequately meet this argument.
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statutory meaning—i.e., what the law is. Without an explanation or guiding principle, any
choice of context is merely rule of unexplained judicial hunch, not the rule of law.76
Further, given Justice Scalia’s terms of debate, this rule of law problem cannot be solved.
If text is the only thing that is law, context is by definition outside law. Because every act of
interpretation requires a choice of context, every act of interpretation necessarily entails resort to
sources beyond law. Thus, under Justice Scalia’s argument, the rule of law is hopelessly
inconsistent with the endeavor of statutory interpretation.77
This problem is solved by adopting the expanded conception of bicameralism and
presentment defended above. Because bicameralism and presentment is significant as a process,
it provides both a text and context with the constitutional status of law.
C.

Disguised Personal Preference

Recall that we treated two related arguments under this heading. First, Justice Scalia
argued that legislative history placed no limits on judicial discretion. In this way, legislative
history disguises the judge’s personal preferences and prejudices. Second, he argued that
legislative history is unreliable because legislators use it to mislead later readers. In this way,
legislative history reflects a legislator’s personal preferences, inserted to thwart the will of
Congress reflected in statutory text. I address each argument in turn.
1.

Unbounded Judicial Discretion

According to Justice Scalia, legislative history’s inherent manipulability allows judges to
covertly implement their personal policy preferences under the guise of statutory interpretation.78
Because legislative history can be bent to support any result, that source cannot constrain judicial
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For further elaboration of this point, see McGreal, supra note 21, at 368-71.
As noted previously, Prof. Manning identifies a similar gap in Justice Scalia’s textualism. See supra note
75. Ultimately, however, his attempt to fill that gap is unpersuasive. Id.
78
See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
77
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discretion. And if legislative history cannot decide cases, then something else—something
unacknowledged, such as personal ideology—must do so.
Yet again, Justice Scalia’s textualism fares no better. Only by ignoring the choice of
context does he avoid discretion. For example, as discussed above, the words “Keep off the
grass” appear to have a natural meaning when said by a drug counselor or a gardener.79 In each
case, we attribute meaning so effortlessly that we sometimes forget that context does much of the
heavy lifting.80 This becomes apparent when those same words appear out of a concrete context.
Then, choice of context becomes conscious, as we must hypothesize a context within which to
understand the words. The act of hypothesizing a context is a choice no less than deciding which
portion of legislative history to credit.
The question, then, is whether hypothesizing a statutory context is any more constrained
than applying legislative history. As Justice Scalia practices the method, hypothesizing context
appears less constrained. He never acknowledges the need to choose a context, nonetheless
provides a standard or method for making that choice. Without standards, the decision is wholly
unconstrained, leaving maximum discretion. With legislative history, there is at least the need to
find and cite some legislative material that supports one’s preferred interpretation. And whether
such material exists is outside the judge’s control; if supportive legislative history does not exist,
the judge may not conjure it on her own. With hypothetical contexts, however, both the chosen
words and their context spring from the judge’s imagination. No external source circumscribes
that choice, leaving the judge free to manipulate the hypothetical context to suit her preferred
interpretation.

79
80

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See Solan, supra note 20, at 252-54
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Further, Justice Scalia’s choice of hypothetical context goes unacknowledged, increasing
the danger of manipulation. Readers may miss that a choice has in fact been made, allowing this
discretion to go unexamined and thus unchallenged. Even when detected, the choice will be hard
to critique because he does not supply reasons for the choice. Without previously recorded
reasons, the writer may offer ex post rationalizations, or simply change the reasons offered
depending on the critiques that emerge. This is particularly offensive on a Court that eschews
the practice of rendering decisions with opinions to follow at a later date. The rationale offered
for this prohibition is that the need to justify a decision in a contemporaneous writing both
affects the ultimate decision and constrains the decision maker’s options.81 Leaving the choice
of hypothetical conversation unacknowledged increases the decision maker’s discretion, thereby
increasing the room for manipulation.
2.

Tainted Words

Aside from its manipulability, Justice Scalia criticizes legislative history materials as
inherently unreliable. Specifically, he complains that interest groups and legislators fill the
legislative record with language that they could not get into the statute’s text. These actors use
legislative history to win battles they lost in drafting the legislation itself. Consequently,
legislative history is not a good faith effort to illuminate a statute’s meaning, but rather an
attempt to deceive later interpreters of the statute.82
Here, Justice Scalia makes an argument without parallel in our constitutional tradition.
Namely, he uses the presumed subjective motivation of legislators to question the validity of
81

See Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Obligation to Maintain the
Constitution as Something We the People Can Understand 5-6 (1992); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without
Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1999)
(discussing law makers’ obligation to explain its decisions); Paul E. McGreal, Constitutional Illiteracy, 30 Ind. L.
Rev. 693, 709-14 (1997) (arguing that we ought to care whether ordinary citizens can understand our constitutional
government).
82
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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their work product. In this argument, Justice Scalia says that genuine legislative history—that is,
legislative history that reflects genuine debate about the meaning and substance of a bill—would
be probative of a statute’s meaning. But, drawing on his personal experience,83 he takes judicial
notice that much legislative history is not genuine—that it is inserted in the legislative record to
mislead later interpreters as to the statute’s meaning. Instead of examining such materials on a
case-by- case basis, as do some of his colleagues, Justice Scalia uses this observation to
irrebuttably presume that bad motives underlie all legislative history materials.
Justice Scalia’s conclusive impugning of legislative motives contradicts many established
practices and principles in constitutional law.84 First, in exercising the power of judicial review
over federal and state statutes, the Court begins with a presumption of constitutionality,85 with
83

See, e.g., Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 36-37 (relying on his experience as “head of
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department” to estimate the amount of time that lawyers generally spend
on researching legislative history). Not surprisingly, another commentator offers a different anecdotal account. See
Stephen Breyer, On the Use of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 867 (1992);
Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 Va. L. Rev. 167, 167 (1988) (“The politicians and other people I have known in
public life just do not fit the ‘rent-seeking’ egoist model that the public choice theorists offer.”). More importantly,
the empirical evidence undercuts Justice Scalia’s gestalt impression.
84
Professor Charles Tiefer argues that recent political science literature undermines the empirical basis for
this argument. See Tiefer, supra note 75, at 264-71. Specifically, Professor Tiefer notes that this argument assumes
that congressional committees are captured by interest groups and thus their views will diverge from those of
Congress as a whole. Id. at 266. But, after the 1994 turnover in Congress, we saw significant changes in voting
patterns even though there was no appreciable change in interest groups. Id. (“Changing the chairs of the
congressional committees changed outcomes, often to a large degree, without any necessary shift in interest
groups.”). Further, analysis of committee and congressional voting patterns reveals that “voting in most committees
matched, more or less, voting in their chambers . . . .” Id. at 267.
85
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (“Statutes are presumed constitutional”) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (“Supreme Court is “reluctan[t] to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State’s program may be
discerned from the face of the statute.”); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901) (“The presumptions
are in favor of constitutionality, and before a court is justified in holding that the legislative power has been
exercised beyond the limits granted, or in conflict with restrictions imposed by the fundamental law, the excess or
conflict should be clear.”). The Court elaborated on this presumption in the Equal Protection case Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312 (1993), where it upheld a statute that applied a different standard of proof for committing mentally ill
and mentally retarded individuals:
A State . . . has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. “[A]
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” A statute is presumed constitutional, and “[t]he burden is on
the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,”
whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis
review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and
ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it “‘is not made with mathematical nicety
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the burden on the challenger to establish unconstitutionality.86 Further, in most areas of
constitutional law, the Court refuses to look beyond the legislature’s asserted purpose for its
legislation.87 For example, in Equal Protection Clause cases, the Court has consistently
examined the government’s asserted purpose in enacting economic regulations, rejecting
arguments based on legislators’ purported subjective biases.88 And even a law that discriminates
based on race may be upheld, if the government can pass strict scrutiny.89 In these areas, the
Court consistently assumes a baseline of legislative good faith, either rejecting inquiry into

or because in practice it results in some inequality.’” “The problems of government are practical ones and
may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.”
Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted).
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In some areas, the burden shifts to the government once the challenger has made a threshold showing. For
example, once a litigant has shown that a statute discriminates based on race, the government must show that the
challenged law is necessary to accomplish a compelling government interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that federal affirmative action programs must meet a strict scrutiny standard);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles And Policies §§ 9.3.2 to 9.3.3, at 668-69 (2d ed. 2002);
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988).
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See generally J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15
San Diego L. Rev. 953, 956 (1978); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36 (1977); Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental
Racism, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1219 (1998); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 (1996).
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See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 1112 (1992) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the
classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been
considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not
so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, U.S. 449
U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification,
litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature
was mistaken.”). The Court may use its means-end Equal Protection analysis to determine whether there is a
dangerous probability that a specific statute was motivated by bias. See Romer v. Evans, U.S. (1996); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Paul E. McGreal, Suspicion in Federal Equal Protection, 8
Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 183, 185-88 (1999). But, in each of these cases, the Court relied on factors indicating
that the statute at issue was impermissibly motivated, rather than impugning legislative motives wholesale. See
Heller, 509 U.S. at 322-24 (upholding discrimination between mentally ill and mentally retarded because the record
did not contain any indications of impermissible bias against the mentally retarded); see also FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
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the classification.”); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (“The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to
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See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal contracting
minority set-aside program); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to state
contracting minority set-aside program).
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legislative motivation, or placing a heavy burden on those seeking to overturn government action
on that basis.
Second, Justice Scalia’s assault on legislative motive flies in the face of separation of
powers concerns, which counsel judicial restraint when examining the inner-workings of
Congress or the Executive.90 To see this point, consider Field v. Clark,91 where the Court was
asked to decide whether the same bill text had passed both houses of Congress and been signed
by the President. If not, it was argued, the statute was invalid as it had not properly passed the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.92 The Court was urged to undertake such
judicial review of the legislative process, lest “it becomes possible for the speaker of the house of
representatives and the president of the senate to impose upon the people as a law a bill that was
never passed by congress.”93 The Court declined this invitation, citing the need for respect
among coordinate branches:
[T]his possibility is too remote to be seriously considered in the present inquiry. It
suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the presiding officers, the committees on
enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with
a common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by
the constitution. Judicial action, based upon such a suggestion, is forbidden by the
respect due to a co-ordinate branch of the government.94
Congress’ internal law making processes were entitled to a conclusive presumption of regularity.
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See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 673 (1892).
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
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Third, the same aversion to questioning legislative motives appears in cases applying the
Speech and Debate Clause.95 The Clause immunizes members of Congress and their aides96
from civil and criminal liability for legislative acts, such as voting, drafting legislation and
committee reports, and speeches and debates on the floor of Congress.97 In United States v.
Johnson,98 the federal government prosecuted Thomas Johnson, a United States Representative,
for a speech delivered on the House floor. The United States alleged that the speech was part of
a conspiracy among Johnson, other House members, and a savings and loan company whereby
the company would pay Johnson and his colleagues to convince the Justice Department to drop
mail fraud indictments against the savings and loan company.99 One count of the indictment
charged Johnson with accepting money in exchange for delivering a congressional speech
defending the savings and loan company.100 The charge rested on a federal statute that punished
any member of Congress who “receives . . . any compensation for any services rendered or to be
rendered . . . in relation to any proceeding . . . in which the United States is . . . directly or
95

U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“for any speech or debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be
questioned in any other place.”) .
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See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) (“It is true that the Clause itself mentions only
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to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of
voting are equally covered”); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) (“In short, . . . things generally done
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(“private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the
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383 U.S. 169 (1966).
99
Id. at 171-72.
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Id. at 184 (the indictment read in relevant part: “It was a part of said conspiracy that the said THOMAS F.
JOHNSON should . . . render services, for compensation, . . . to wit, the making of a speech, defending the
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indirectly interested,”101 as well as a federal statute that punished any person who conspires “to
defraud the United States.”102 The Court explained that “the essence of such a charge is that the
Congressman’s conduct was improperly motivated.”103 The question, then, was whether the
Speech and Debate Clause protected members of Congress from legal proceedings that
questioned their motive in making statements before Congress.104
The Court strongly rejected such an inquiry into legislative motives: “However
reprehensible such conduct may be, we believe the Speech or Debate Clause extends at least so
far as to prevent it from being made the basis of a criminal charge against a member of Congress
of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the due discharge of government
functions.”105 Allowing judicial inquiry into legislative motive, especially in a proceeding
initiated by the executive branch, would impermissibly erode legislative independence.
Otherwise, “critical or disfavored legislators” could be attacked in “a judicial forum” on vague
allegations of improper motive.106 Preventing such attacks “is the predominate thrust of the
Speech or Debate Clause.”107
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Id. at 170 n.1.
Id. at 171 n.2.
Id. at 180.
The Court explained that the trial proceedings probed deeply into Rep. Johnson’s preparation for the

speech:
Extensive questioning went on concerning how much of the speech was written by Johnson himself, how
much by his administrative assistant, and how much by outsiders representing the loan company. The
government attorney asked Johnson specifically about certain sentences in the speech, the reasons for their
inclusion and his personal knowledge of the factual material supporting those statements. In closing
argument the theory of the prosecution was very clearly dependent upon the wording of the speech. In
addition to questioning the manner of preparation and the precise ingredients of the speech, the
Government inquired into the motives for giving it.
Id. at 173-74.
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Id. at 180.
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Id. at 181.
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Id.
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Fourth, hesitance to question legislative motives has venerable roots, appearing in Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck.108 Fletcher involved an attempt to invalidate a
land grant by the Georgia legislature to private parties. One challenge to the grant was that
members of the Georgia legislature were promised an interest in the land if the legislature
ultimately passed the land grant.109 It was argued that this promise “unduly influenced” the state
legislators, making the resulting legislative land grant, and its purported transfer, “a nullity.”110
Chief Justice Marshall farmed the issue as whether “the validity of a law depends upon the
motives of its framers, and how far the particular inducements, operating on members of the
supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation of a contract by that power, are examinable
in a court of justice.”111
Chief Justice Marshall refused judicial review on two grounds. First, he noted two
practical difficulties with assessing legislative motives: “If the majority of the legislature be
corrupted, it may well be doubted, whether it be within the province of the judiciary to control
their conduct, and, if less than a majority act from impure motives, the principle by which
judicial interference would be regulated, is not clearly discerned.”112 One the one hand, courts
would be powerless to affect a legislature controlled by a corrupt majority. As courts have
neither the power of the sword nor the power of the purse, they have little if any ammunition to
fight such forces.113 On the other hand, if corruption is confined to a minority of the legislature,
courts have no administrable standard to decide when such corruption should invalidate a law.
When judges have no judicially-applicable standards, they should stay out of the controversy.
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See McGreal, supra note 73, at 1147-48 (discussing the relatively weak position of the judiciary).
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Second, on principle, judges ought not entertain such challenges to legislative motive.
Chief Justice Marshall characterized such suits as “indecent, in the extreme,”114 as they insult the
dignity of a collateral branch of government. If the challenged law is one “which the legislature
might constitutionally pass, if the act be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court,
sitting as a court of law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual against another founded
on the allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of the impure motives which influenced
certain members of the legislature which passed the law.”115 The remedy for ill-considered or
improperly motivated laws is the political process, where the people can turn the offending
legislators out of office.116
Fifth, the Constitution commits to each house the power to regulate its own
proceedings.117 Pursuant to that power, early Congresses established an embryonic form of the
legislative process we have today, replete with a committee system and rules of procedure.
Unless a chamber’s rules violate some independent constitutional provision,118 the Court has not
second-guessed a chamber’s method of proceeding.119
These constitutional principles counsel against wholesale rejection of legislative history.
As Justice Scalia admits by grounding his textualism on bicameralism and presentment, statutory
interpretation is a constitutional function that must make sense as a practice under our
Constitution. As previous sections have argued, bicameralism and presentment is the
114
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constitutionally-appointed context that gives statutes their meaning, and legislative history is
evidence of that context. No federal court should ignore this context merely because anecdotal
evidence suggests that some of these materials are suspect. To do so would be to conclusively
presume legislative bad faith regardless of the underlying circumstances, which the Supreme
Court has steadfastly refused to do.
To be clear, I am not arguing that every scrap of legislative history has equal importance.
As with any other aspect of context, each piece must be weighed against the others to consider
how well it describes the overall context of enactment. And the Supreme Court has done just
that in according different weight to different types of legislative history.120 For example, the
Court weighs drafting history heavily, as it shows the different choices made in crafting statutory
language.121 Similarly, a legislator’s or committee’s explanation of a “text’s pedigree” can offer
guidance on interpretation.122 And a conference committee report may shed significant light on a
statute’s meaning.123 This approach mirrors the Court’s attitude toward Congress in other
areas—assume a baseline of legislative good faith, loosening or abandoning that assumption as
the circumstances require.

House [and t]he power to make rules is[,] within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal.”).
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See Tiefer, supra note 75, at 232-50 (discussing the Court’s recent use of various types of legislative
history). But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 1879-81 (1998) (criticizing the Court’s hierarchy of legislative history
materials).
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Conclusion
Parsing legislative history is not likely to be easy. But, as Justice Scalia himself
concedes, ease of application is not the Holy Grail of our quest.124 Rather, we seek an approach
to statutory interpretation that both makes sense on it own terms and makes sense of American
constitutional government. Justice Scalia’s rejection of legislative history fails these twin
demands because it ignores the inseparability of text and context.
On its own terms, rejecting legislative history, without saying more, makes no sense.
Text cannot be understood absent a context. Rejecting legislative history simply eliminates one
possible interpretive context, without identifying some other context to fill the interpretive gap.
Thus, the textualist account is incomplete.
Rejecting legislative history also fails the test of consistency with constitutional
government. Justice Scalia offers bicameralism and presentment as the constitutional measuring
stick. Yet, he follows his logic only half way—he accepts the text produced by that process, but
not the context. As argued here, this separation of text and context cannot be justified. Because
legislative history reflects the context of bicameralism and presentment, it provides the
constitutionally-preferred context for determining statutory meaning.

124

Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6, at 45.

36

